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Carolina Supreme Court?
JUSTICE ROBERT ORR*
INTRODUCTION
Once the North Carolina Court of Appeals has filed a decision,
there are two separate grounds for seeking a review as of right to the
North Carolina Supreme Court.' If there is a dissent at the court of
appeals, the issue or issues upon which the dissent is based are
automatically eligible for review by the supreme court.2 Also, when a
decision from the court of appeals "directly involves a substantial
question arising under the Constitution of the United States or of this
State," an appeal lies of right to the North Carolina Supreme Court.'
There is perhaps no aspect of appellate practice in North Carolina that
has left practitioners as perplexed as the question of what exactly
constitutes a substantial constitutional question, particularly as it applies
to the North Carolina Constitution.
This Article will examine the history of the statutory right of appeal
based upon a substantial constitutional question; highlight the
interpretation and application of this provision, particularly over the
* Justice Robert F. Orr (Ret.) is executive director and senior counsel at the North
Carolina Institute for Constitutional Law. He retired from the North Carolina Supreme
Court after nearly ten years of service and previously had served on the North Carolina
Court of Appeals for eight years. He wishes to thank Campbell Law Review staff
members Weston Davis, Joe Frost and Ashley Reger for their assistance on this Article.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (2010).
2. Id. § 7A-30(2). Note: Only the issues upon which the dissent is based are
eligible for review by the supreme court in this instance.
3. Id. § 7A-30(1).
211
1
Orr: What Exactly is a "Substantial Constitutional Question" for Purpo
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
past five years; provide a look at a few of the cases in which the North
Carolina Supreme Court has accepted the notice of appeal ("NOA")
based upon a substantial constitutional question or instead has
dismissed and not retained; and propose an appropriate test for applying
this provision and potential statutory amendments that will better define
and more uniformly address the question of what constitutes a
substantial constitutional question.
I. THE HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO APPEAL BASED
UPON A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
The primary source material for the historical background of the
right to appeal provision comes from the 1967 report to the North
Carolina General Assembly by the Courts Commission for the state
("Commission Report").' The commission, a group chosen from among
North Carolina's legal elite and appointed in 1963, worked for several
years on reforming the state's judicial structure and sought to determine
the best way for handling appeals from the trial level.' The North
Carolina Supreme Court was consistently considered as "perhaps the
busiest in the entire country" and was on the verge of crisis.6 At that
time, the supreme court handled all appeals from the trial level.' In
addition to the myriad of other duties imposed upon the court, each
justice was responsible for writing over fifty opinions each year.' The
Courts Commission concluded that the solution was to amend the North
Carolina Constitution to create an intermediate court of appeals within
4. STATE OF N.C. COURTS COMM'N, REPORT OF THE COURTS COMMISSION TO THE NORTH
CAROLINA GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1967).
5. Id. The Courts Commission was created by a 1963 resolution entitled:
"Resolution 73. A JOINT RESOLUTION PROVIDING FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF A COMMISSION
WHICH SHALL BE CHARGED WITH THE RESPONSIBILITY OF MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY NECESSARY TO IMPLEMENT THE JUDICIAL ARTICLE OF THE CONSTITUTION."
It was ratified in the General Assembly on June 11, 1963.
6. Id. at 2.
7. The commission report states:
Under our pre-1965 Constitution, all appellate jurisdiction above the trial
division was vested in the Supreme Court, and such jurisdiction as is now to be
given to the Court of Appeals is necessarily taken from the Supreme Court.
However, the exercise of jurisdiction given to the Court of Appeals may still be
subject to review by the Supreme Court . ...
Id. at 11.
8. N.C. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON IMPROVING AND EXPEDITING THE
ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE IN NORTH CAROLINA 9 (1958).
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the appellate division of the general court of justice.9 The commission
noted:
The proposal to amend the Constitution to permit the establishment of a
Court of Appeals, supported by the Governor, the Courts Commission,
the Supreme Court, and the organized bar, was adopted by the General
Assembly. It was submitted to the people in the general election of
1965. The people responded with an overwhelming majority for the
amendment.10
From 1966 through 1967, the Courts Commission worked to develop
legislation to redesign the appellate division." The Commission Report
represents the official recommendations of the commission to the
General Assembly setting out the specific proposals for adoption.
Having the legislative and constitutional mandate to create a court
of appeals, the commission sought to establish the fundamental
principles that would govern the creation of the new court. The guiding
principles established by the Commission Report set the stage for the
question posed by this Article.
The first principle enunciated by the commission was: "One trial on
the merits, and one appeal on the law, as of right, in every case."12 The
commission noted that this is a "traditional principle of Anglo-Saxon and
North Carolina jurisprudence, and must be preserved."' It was further
noted "that double appeals, as of right, are to be avoided, except in the
most unusual cases, the importance of which can be said to justify a
second review.""
The second principle set forth was: "The Supreme Court must
remain the court entrusted with the final decision on all truly important
questions of law."" The cases that do not involve jurisprudence of
interest or importance to the state as a whole or those involving only
routine determination of issues of importance only to the litigants
involved must have their final resolution at the court of appeals level.'"
According to the Commission Report: (1) capital cases and (2) cases
9. N.C. COURTS COMM'N, supra note 4, at 2.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2-3.
12. Id. at 4.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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involving constitutional interpretations should, by statute, have direct
access to the supreme court. 17
After lengthy explication of the structure for the new court of
appeals, the commission turned to the question of the jurisdictions of
the court of appeals and the supreme court."'
Under our pre-1965 Constitution all appellate jurisdiction above the trial
division was vested in the Supreme Court, and such jurisdiction as is
now to be given to the Court of Appeals is necessarily taken from the
Supreme Court. However, the exercise of jurisdiction given to the Court
of Appeals may still be subject to review by the Supreme Court, and
hence it is possible to speak with accuracy and clarity only of the
jurisdiction of the Appellate Division . .. 19
The 1965 amendment to article IV of the constitution gave authority to
the General Assembly to set the jurisdiction of the court of appeals."
The commission noted, however, "[i1t is clear that the Supreme Court is
empowered directly by the Constitution (though not compelled by it) to
review any and all cases . . . ." The commission's approach, as they
noted in the Commission Report, was thus unhindered in setting out a
system of jurisdiction that reflects the hierarchy of the supreme court
and court of appeals.
The Commission Report states:
[the] functions of appellate courts in general are two-fold. First, they
correct error committed at the trial level which is prejudicial to a
litigant ... . Second, they develop the jurisprudence of the state through
their reported decisions, i.e., they serve the precedential function of the
common law system by declaring, expanding, and clarifying the case law
of the state.
The Commission Report then includes an observation of considerable
significance to the purpose of this Article: "Obviously, those cases having
this added dimension of general jurisprudential significance should be
reviewed by our highest, our most prestigious, court. As a corollary,
those cases which, in great numbers, do not have this added dimension
seem the natural basic material for the other appellate court."2
17. Id.
18. Id. at 4-11.
19. Id. at 11.
20. See N.C. CoNST. art. IV, § 12(2).
21. N.C. COURTS COMM'N, supra note 4, at 11.
22. Id. at 12.
23. Id. at 13.
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The commission then points out that the principle of one appeal
rather than two is the ideal:
This is to say that, in principle, double appeals ought to be avoided in all
cases . ... And if the case does not have this added measure of general
significance, then only waste of time and added expense with no
sufficient counterbalancing value will result from allowing such a case to
be subject to a second review by the highest court at the option of the
litigants.
Thus, the "central feature" of the jurisdictional approach taken by
the commission was that every case, civil or criminal, from either of the
trial divisions would be initially appealed directly to the court of
appeals. While all cases without a motion seeking higher review would
go to the intermediate court, "[tihe Supreme Court is empowered either
on its own motion or on motion of either party, and either prior to or
after determination of any such case by the Court of Appeals, to call the
case up ("certify" it) for final determination by the Supreme Court."2 6
North Carolina General Statutes sections 7A-30 and 31 set out the
standards that guide the supreme court in making this determination.
Section 7A-31(b) delineates four issues for the supreme court to
consider in taking a case prior to determination by the court of appeals:
(1) The subject matter of the appeal has significant public interest, or
(2) The cause involves legal principles of major significance to the
jurisprudence of the State, or
(3) Delay in final adjudication is likely to result from failure to certify
and thereby cause substantial harm, or
(4) The work load of the courts of the appellate division is such that the
expeditious administration of justice requires certification.2 7
Section 7A-31(c) next addresses the criteria to be considered
subsequent to a decision by the court of appeals.28 Sections 7A-31(c)(1)
and (2), which deal with significant public interest and legal principles
of major significance to the jurisprudence of the state, contain the exact
language of sections 7A-31(b)(1) and (2)." However, section 7A-
31(c)(3) differs and states that a case may be brought before the
24. Id.
25. Id. at 15.
26. Id.
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(b) (2010); see also N.C. COURTS COMM'N, supra note 4,
at 15-19.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(c).
29. Id. H§ 7A-31(c)(1), (2).
2011]1 215
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supreme court if "[tihe decision of the Court of Appeals appears likely to
be in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court."30 The impression
of the commission was that this language served as a directive to the
supreme court "that it should ordinarily call up to itself' for second
review any decisions of the court of appeals that meet these criteria.
While the discretionary provisions for jurisdiction by the supreme
court provides an opportunity for litigants to petition the state's highest
court to review a lower court decision, it is the automatic right of appeal
that is of primary concern in this Article, specifically the automatic right
of petitioners to bring claims involving a substantial constitutional
question before the state's highest court.
11. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS ARISING UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OR OF THIS STATE
Since the inception of the court of appeals and the new
jurisdictional standards articulated in the statutes, little case law has
addressed the interpretation of a "substantial question arising under the
Constitution of the United States or of this State."32 Nothing has been
set out that distinguishes questions arising under our state constitution
as opposed to the federal Constitution. One can argue that the federal
courts have and will continue to answer questions conclusively under
the United States Constitution, and thus it is reasonable to anticipate
that the North Carolina Supreme Court would take few cases dealing
with federal constitutional issues that have already been conclusively
determined by other courts. On the other hand, it would seem far more
likely that the North Carolina Supreme Court would aggressively accept
and even seek out constitutional questions arising under the North
Carolina Constitution about which it would, and should, be the final
30. Id. § 7A-31(c)(3).
31. N.C. COURTS COMM'N, supra note 4, at 16. Of course, it is the supreme court's
ultimate decision to interpret these factors and apply them to the issues decided at the
court of appeals. Based upon the numbers set forth above, it appears as though the
supreme court has been increasingly reluctant to allow petitions for discretionary review
either prior to or subsequent to a decision by the court of appeals.
32. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(1); see State v. Colson, 163 S.E.2d 376, 380 (N.C.
1968) (noting the creation of the court of appeals in 1967 and subsequent enactment of
the statutory right of appeal to the supreme court based upon a substantial constitutional
question).
216 [Vol. 33:211
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arbiter. That, however, has not been the case as evidenced by the
numbers, particularly over the past five years.
A. Trends in Case Load in the Appellate Courts
The implementation of the new appellate system began in 1967
upon the passage of legislation setting forth the organization of the new
court of appeals, the new jurisdictional requirements, and new North
Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.34 It would be some time before
the handiwork of the courts commission would actually kick in. Over
time the process that was created has served the state well. We have
seen the court of appeals workload expand significantly and the number
of judges increase from the original six to the current fifteen." However,
as the number of cases decided by the court of appeals continues to be in
the thousands, the number of cases decided by the supreme court has
dramatically dropped. 6 The table below shows the trend in the number
of opinions written by the court of appeals ("COA") versus the supreme
court ("N.C. Sup. Ct.") since 2000.
Year COA3 7  N.C. Sup. Ct.3 8
2000 1317 102
2001 1386 105
2002 1613 107
2003 1310 103
2004 1452 93
2005 1638 96
33. In the last five years, the North Carolina Supreme Court has retained only two
cases where a party asked the court to review a substantial constitutional question
pursuant to section 7A-30(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes. Those two cases
were Libertarian Party of N.C. v. State, 690 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. 2010), and Riverpointe
Homeowners Ass'n v. Mallory, 666 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 2008).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A. Note: The 1965 constitutional amendment to article IV
was approved by the voters in November 1965 and became effective on October 1, 1967.
35. Id. § 7A-16.
36. This phenomena is particularly striking when the opinions of the supreme court
are broken down by written opinions and per curiam opinions.
37. These numbers reflect the total number of opinions from the court of appeals.
Approximately 60 percent of the court of appeals opinions over the last ten years were
unpublished, with the remaining 40 percent being published.
38. N.C. Appellate Courts, Supreme Court Opinions, http://appellate.nccourts.org/
opinions/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011). These numbers reflect the total number of
opinions from the North Carolina Supreme Court, including one-page per curiam
opinions.
2011] 217
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2006
2007
1495
1596
88
90
2008 1444 86
2009 1391 71
Part of the numerical imbalance, particularly over the past several
years, has arisen as a result of the decreasing number of dissents at the
court of appeals. Perhaps one can attribute this decrease to the
retirement of several judges noted for frequent dissents.3 9 However, this
decrease also may have been driven by an appropriate emphasis on
"collegiality" and working towards a unanimous court of appeals
decision. As dissents at the court of appeals have decreased, reducing
the number of cases in which an automatic right of appeal exists to the
supreme court, other factors have also come into play. Life sentences are
no longer sent directly to the supreme court for review, thus
substantially reducing the number of decisions by the supreme court.40
Additionally, North Carolina has seen a dramatic drop in the imposition
of the death penalty, and thus fewer and fewer capital cases are being
sent to the supreme court for review."
39. The judges noted for frequent dissents who have recently retired include: Judge
K. Edward Greene and Judge John Tyson.
40. The Commission Report articulated only one area for direct appeal to the
supreme court, thus automatically bypassing the court of appeals, and that exception
involved cases in which a death sentence or a life sentence was imposed. See N.C.
COURTS COMM'N, supra note 4, at 19. Later, the General Assembly added general rate
cases to this category, and in 1995 the life sentence cases were removed from the statute
allowing a direct appeal. Now life sentence cases go first to the court of appeals, rather
than the supreme court. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27. The life imprisonment cases were
struck from this statute by the 1995 Session Laws of North Carolina. 1995 N.C. Sess.
Laws 204, § 1.
41. Over the past ten years, there has been a steady decline in the number of death
cases heard by the North Carolina Supreme Court, as indicated in the table below. See
N.C. A >pellate Courts, supra note 38.
Year Capital Cases Decided
2000 24
2001 20
2002 19
2003 13
2004 11
2005 8
2006 5
2007 4
2008 5
2009 5
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With the number of dissents and death penalty cases declining, the
supreme court's docket has become more dependent on the supreme
court's granting of petitions for discretionary review and, most
importantly, appeals of right based upon a constitutional question
arising under the United States Constitution or the North Carolina
Constitution. Unfortunately, the supreme court has been remarkably
reserved in granting petitions for discretionary review. Attempts to
secure review under the guaranteed statutory right of appeal based upon
a substantial constitutional question have resulted in all but a few of
these NOAs being dismissed. These dismissals are a result of a motion
to dismiss by the opposing party of the court's own motion to dismiss."
A basic review of court statistics reveals that in the term beginning
in fall 2004 and running through spring 2010 there were 482 NOAs of
right to the supreme court based upon an issue or issues involving a
substantial constitutional question. Of these NOAs, the records reflect
that the supreme court has retained only two, and dismissed, either on a
party's motion or the court's motion, the other 480.46 This staggering
disparity raises the fundamental question puzzling practitioners of what,
exactly, has to be shown in exercising the absolute statutory right of
appeal for the court to actually retain and decide an issue.
In all fairness to the court, the appealing party often addresses the
issue of retaining a substantial constitutional question in a combination
of ways. First, there may be a dissent that touches on or directly
addresses the constitutional issue, and thus, that issue reaches the
supreme court by automatic right of appeal. Second, it is common
practice to file an NOA based upon a substantial constitutional
question-alleging an absolute statutory right-but then hedge the
42. N.C. GEN. STAT. H§ 7A-30, -31.
43. A LexisNexis search for section 7A-30 (excluding 7A-30(2)) notices of appeals
retained by the court for approximately the past five years (from January 1, 2004 to July
30, 2010) revealed only three cases: Libertarian Party of N.C. v. State, 690 S.E.2d 700
(N.C. 2010), Riverpointe Homeowners Ass'n v. Mallory, 666 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 2008), and
State v. Bowes, 592 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. 2004).
44. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 547 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2001) (dismissing notice of appeal
ex mero motu and denying petition for discretionary review); Blinson v. State, 661 S.E.2d
280 (N.C. 2008) (dismissing notice of appeal upon motion of the respondents-
appellees).
45. This search was conducted on LexisNexis with the assistance of members of the
staff of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
46. Libertarian Party of N.C. v. State, 690 S.E.2d 700 (N.C. 2010); Riverpointe
Homeowners Ass'n v. Mallory, 666 S.E.2d 487 (N.C. 2008).
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30(2).
2011]1 219
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possibility of the court disagreeing and alternatively petition for
discretionary review."8 Using this approach, the appellant gives the
court two different options by which it may take up the issue. Should
the court conclude that the constitutional question is not "substantial" or
that it has been conclusively determined previously, the appellant can
still attempt to make an argument that the case merits review under the
statutory guidance dealing with petitions for discretionary review." In
practice, however, these circumstances appear to be few and far
between.o
B. Case law in North Carolina on Substantial Constitutional Questions
The case law that has developed over the years, articulating the
definition of a substantial constitutional question, is limited in its
usefulness and articulates a standard of interpretation that raises more
questions than it answers. In State v. Colson," the earliest case on point,
the defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the death of his wife."
In response to the defendant's effort to obtain supreme court review of
the decision below, the court set forth a test requiring the appellant to
allege and show the involvement of a substantial constitutional question,
or else have the appeal dismissed.53 The court announced: "The question
must be real and substantial rather than superficial and frivolous. It
must be a constitutional question which has not already been the subject
of conclusive judicial determination."5 ' The court further explained that
the:
Iml ere mouthing of constitutional phrases like 'due process of law' and
'equal protection of the law' will not avoid dismissal. Once involvement
of a substantial constitutional question is established, the Court will
retain the case and may, in its discretion, pass upon any or all
48. See, e.g., NOA of Right & Petition for Discretionary Review, Blinson, No.
546PO6-2 (N.C. Nov. 19, 2007).
49. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-31.
50. Thomas L. Fowler, Appellate Rule 16 (b): The Scope of Review in an Appeal Based
Solely upon a Dissent in the Court of Appeals, 24 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 5 (2001) ("[I]n practice
supreme courts actually grant discretionary review in only a small percentage of the
cases where it is requested.").
51. State v. Colson, 163 S.E.2d 376 (N.C. 1968).
52. Id. at 378.
53. Id. at 383.
54. Id.
220 [Vol. 33:211
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assignments of error, constitutional or otherwise, allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals and properly presented ... for review.55
Throughout the 1970s, the court occasionally addressed this issue,
but simply re-articulated the Colson standard for determining what a
substantial constitutional question is.56 Over the past thirty years, the
supreme court has not announced any new decisions on this issue. The
old standard, as previously set out, remains to this day the test to be
applied, both by appellants trying to secure review of a court of appeals
decision that involves a purported substantial constitutional question,
and likewise by the supreme court in deciding whether to dismiss or
retain a case brought upon the statutory right of appeal.
One of the primary causes of uncertainty in this area is the fact that
the court does not articulate its reasoning for dismissing an appeal of
right based upon a substantial constitutional question. As previously
noted, the court can, on its own motion, dismiss an appeal - a practice
that regularly occurs. Once the appeal is dismissed, the practicing bar
has no grounds for understanding the court's actions because no opinion
is written addressing the court's rationale. Moreover, because the
losing party is stuck with the supreme court's decision and has no
further recourse, short of petitioning the United States Supreme Court if
a federal constitutional issue is raised, the resulting dismissal creates
more confusion and uncertainty in pursuing this statutory right of
appeal.60
55. Id. Note: Assignments of error are now eliminated.
56. See Ward v. Daily Reflector, 393 S.E.2d 907, 908 (N.C. 1990); Thompson v.
Thompson, 215 S.E.2d 606, 607 (N.C. 1975); State v. Brown, 215 S.E.2d 150, 153 (N.C.
1975); State v. Cumber, 185 S.E.2d 141, 144 (N.C. 1971); Bundy v. Ayscue, 171 S.E.2d
1, 3 (N.C. 1969); State v. Cavallaro, 164 S.E.2d 168, 171 (N.C. 1968).
57. There has been no new authority on the issue past Thompson, and rule 14(b)(2)
of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure reflects this standard. See N.C. R.
App. P. 14(b)(2).
58. See, e.g., In re Jones, 279 N.C. 616, 618 (1971) (dismissing the case, ex mero
motu, because there was no substantial constitutional question).
59. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 547 S.E.2d 420 (N.C. 2001) (dismissing notice of appeal
ex mero motu without explanation).
60. See generally Fowler, supra note 50, at 1-5, nn.1-18 (discussing the law
development function of appellate courts).
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III. Two CASES IN WHICH THE SUPREME COURT HAS DISMISSED THE
NOTICE OF APPEAL BASED UPON A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL
QUESTION AND ALSO DENIED THE PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
It must be acknowledged that many of the cases appealed to the
supreme court based upon a substantial constitutional question fail to
meet the test established by case law, either because the question is
clearly not substantial, or the court correctly concludes that the issue has
been conclusively determined. Many of these cases are criminal appeals
and primarily involve federal constitutional questions that arguably have
been conclusively decided by the federal courts.6 1 One caveat should be
noted, in particular, in dealing with cases in which a provision of the
United States Constitution is involved. If there is a similar provision in
the North Carolina Constitution, North Carolina courts can extend even
greater protection to an individual under the state constitution than is
concomitantly granted under the federal Constitution.62 However, even
giving great deference to the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision-
making process, the numbers reflect a massive resistance on the part of
the court to accept these issues that are statutorily guaranteed the right
of appeal to the state's highest court. 63
A. Blinson v. State of North Carolina (The Dell Case)
In November of 2004, the General Assembly of North Carolina was
called into special session by then Governor Michael Easley for the
purpose of passing a legislative package of so-called "incentives" to
induce an unnamed corporate entity to locate a facility in the state.6 4 In
this one-day session, legislation was introduced, briefly debated with no
amendments to the legislation, accepted and ultimately passed.65 The
61. A LexisNexis search in the date range of January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010
for "7A-30" and "substantial constitutional" returns 887 cases. A focus search of "'5" or
"6" or "Fifth Amendment" or "Sixth Amendment" returns 278 cases. A second focus
search of "denied" returns 220 cases.
62. See State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988).
63. A LexisNexis search in the date range of January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2010
for "7A-30" and "substantial constitutional" returns 887 cases. A focus search of "denied"
returns 701 cases. The North Carolina Supreme Court denied review on 701 of 887
cases (79%) asserting a substantial constitutional issue.
64. Then Governor Michael Easley called the General Assembly into special session
on November 4, 2004 to consider an incentives package for Dell. See Computer
Manufacturing Tax Incentives, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 204.
65. See id. The "Dell Legislation" created article 3G of chapter 105, Tax Incentives
for Major Computer Manufacturing Facilities (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. H§ 105-129.60
222 [Vol. 33:211
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new law enhanced existing tax incentives and provided tax credits for
qualifying major computer manufacturing facilities. 66
Following the passage of this legislation, Dell announced plans to
build a major computer assembly plant in the Piedmont Triad region of
the state. 67 At the time, it was estimated that the value of the incentives
package provided by the state over the course of a number of years
would approximate $270,000,000.68 Following this announcement, Dell
proceeded to negotiate with three counties in the Piedmont Triad
region-Davidson, Guilford and Forsyth, as well as certain
municipalities within those counties-for local incentives to locate the
plant in one of those counties.69 During the next several months, Dell
secured approximately $30,000,000 in local incentives from Forsyth
County and the City of Winston-Salem in agreement for locating the
facility in the Alliance Science and Technology Park in Forsyth
County."
to 66). Sections 105-129.60 to .66 of the North Carolina General Statutes were repealed
effective July 1, 2010 by the 2010 session laws. 2010 N.C. Sess. Laws 166, § 2.2.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-129.64 (2010).
67. On November 9, 2004 Dell announced its plans to accept the incentives package
and build a PC manufacturing plant in North Carolina. John G. Spooner, Dell to Spend
$115 Million on New Plant, CNET NEWS, Nov. 9, 2004, available at
http://news.cnet.com/Dell-to-spend-115-million-on-new-plant/2100-1003_3-
5445055.html.
68. See David Rice, Dell Picks Triad for New Plant Company Plans to Hire 700 in First
Year, THE WINSTON-SALEM JOURNAL, Nov. 10, 2004, available at
http://www2.journalnow.com/news/2004/nov/10/dell-picks-triad-new-plant-company-
plans-hire-700--ar-94793/.
69. See Dell Timeline, News-Record.com, Oct. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.news-record.com/content/2009/10/08/article/delltimeline ("Nov. 19, 2004:
Guilford lays out its offer of $7.1 million in incentives. Dec. 7, 2004: The Greensboro
City Council votes to offer $5.3 million in cash grants and other incentives.
Dec. 13, 2004: Forsyth County passes largest economic incentives package in county
history, offering $14.8 million in cash and services. Dec. 14, 2004: Davidson County
approves a $23.1 million incentives package. Dec. 20, 2004: The Winston-Salem City
Council approves an $18.9 million package. Combined with the Forsyth County offer
and free land, the total package is $37.2 million. Dec. 22, 2004: Dell selects Forsyth
County site for the plant.")
70. See Complaint at 14-15, Blinson v. State, No. 05 CVS 8378, 2005 WL 6340135
(N.C. Super. Ct., Wake County June 23, 2005), available at
http://www.ncicl.org/assets/uploads/brief/2005.06.23-dell-complaint-w-exhibits.pdf.
"On or about December 20, 2004, the County, by and through its duly elected Board of
Commissioners adopted a resolution entitled: 'Resolution Authorizing the Expenditure
of County General Funds for an Economic Development Project and Authorizing
Execution of an Agreement with Winston-Salem Business, Inc. and Dell, Inc.,' ('County
Resolution') approving and authorizing an economic development project to assist Dell
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On June 23, 2005, in the case of State v. Blinson,7 a group of seven
individual taxpayers filed a declaratory judgment action against the State
of North Carolina, Forsyth County, and the City of Winston-Salem, as
well as various state and local officials in their official capacities.12 The
complaint asserted that the state and local acts awarding the incentives
to Dell violated various provisions of the federal and state
constitutions. The complaint was subsequently amended on
September 9, 2005," and the defendants filed motions to dismiss under
rule 12(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of
standing and under rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim for relief."
The defendants never filed an answer, and the trial court subsequently
granted the defendants' motions, concluding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing to challenge the actions and had failed to state a claim for
relief.16 The plaintiffs appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.
The plaintiffs narrowed the number of issues brought forward from
the trial court on appeal to the court of appeals. Of course, the
underlying issue was whether the trial court had erred in dismissing the
case under rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). On appeal, however, the
defendants acknowledged that the plaintiffs had standing under rule
12(b)(1) as to certain claims based upon the supreme court's decision in
Goldston v. State.7 Under two of the plaintiffs' claims, the Uniformity of
in an amount up to $14,760,000 from available revenues in the County's General Fund
over a fifteen-year period." Id. at 14. "On or about December 20, 2004, the City, by and
through its duly elected City Council adopted a resolution agreeing to provide Dell
$18,926,250 in economic development grants and to convey 209.388 acres of land in the
Alliance Science and Technology Business Park to WSBI for site preparation and for the
construction of a computer assembly plant for Dell. Upon information and belief, the
fair market value of the aforementioned property is at least $7,000,000." Id. at 15. "In
total, the City and County agreed to provide at least $37,000,000 in public funds and
foregone tax revenue to Dell." Id. at 15.
71. Blinson, No. 05 CVS 8378, 2006 WL 6342964 (N.C. Super. Ct., Wake County
May 10, 2006).
72. See id.
73. See Complaint, supra note 70.
74. See Amended Complaint, Blinson, No. 05 CVS 8378, 2005 WL 6340135 (N.C.
Super. Ct., Wake County Sept. 9, 2005).
75. See Motion for Defendant, Blinson, No. 05 CVS 8378, 2005 WL 6340118 (N.C.
Super. Ct., Wake County Oct. 12, 2005).
76. Blinson v. State, No. 05 CVS 8378, 2006 WL 6342964 (May 10, 2006). By order
of Judge Robert H. Hobgoodall, all of plaintiffs' claims were dismissed. Id.
77. See Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268, 273-74 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (citing
Goldston v. State, 637 S.E.2d 876 (N.C. 2006) (holding that taxpayers had standing to
seek declaration as to constitutionality of withdraws, and declaratory judgment was an
appropriate remedy).
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Taxation claim under the North Carolina Constitution and the Dormant
Commerce Clause under the United States Constitution, the court of
appeals determined that the plaintiffs did not have standing.7 "
Based upon allegations in their complaint, three of the substantive
claims pursued at the court of appeals by the plaintiffs were based upon
the North Carolina Constitution. This reliance included: (1) the "Public
Purpose Clauses," which says in essence that the power of government to
tax citizens and ultimately spend that tax revenue must be done for a
public purpose only;79 (2) the "Exclusive Emoluments Clause of the
Declaration of Rights," which says that government cannot give
exclusive emoluments to anyone except in exchange for public service;o
and (3) the "Uniformity of Taxation Clauses," which says that laws
imposing taxes should be applied in a uniform manner."' The plaintiffs
also raised issues under the United States Constitution's Dormant
Commerce Clause and the local government acts.82
Blinson was argued at the court of appeals on April 25, 2007, and
decided by a unanimous panel on October 16, 2007.83 The decision,
written by Judge Martha Geer and concurred in by Judges Wynn and
Elmore, stated that the court agreed with the trial court that the
plaintiffs lacked standing under the state Uniformity of Taxation Clauses
and the federal Dormant Commerce Clause, but also concluded that the
plaintiffs did have standing to bring their claims under the Public
Purpose and Exclusive Emoluments Clauses." The opinion thus
focused on these two claims. 5
The first part of the Public Purpose Doctrine, article V, section 2(1)
of the North Carolina Constitution, provides that "the power of taxation
shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, for public purposes
only, and shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away. "86
78. Id. at 274. The supreme court however granted a petition for discretionary
review on October 7, 2010 in Munger v. State (The Google Case), No. 130PA10, on the
issue of standing under the Uniformity of Taxation Clause. Munger v. State, 702 S.E.2d
303 (N.C. 2010).
79. N.C. CONST. art. V, H§ 2(1), (7).
80. Id. art. 1, § 32.
81. Id. art. V, §§ 2(2), (3).
82. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 (2010).
83. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007).
84. Id. at 279.
85. Id. at 274-79.
86. N.C. CONST. art V, § 2(1).
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The starting point for the public purpose analysis began with Maready v.
City of Winston-Salem."
The Maready decision arguably played a critical role in the supreme
court's determination not to review Blinson. Maready was a 1996
decision by the North Carolina Supreme Court arising out of a
"challenge[] [to] twenty-four economic development incentive projects
entered into by the City [of Winston-Salem] or [Forsyth] County.""
The trial court below held that section 158-7.1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, under the authority of which the incentives had been
granted, was in violation of the Public Purpose Clauses of the North
Carolina Constitution and hence unconstitutional.8 9 The state submitted
a petition to the supreme court for discretionary review that was
allowed, along with an expedited briefing and oral argument schedule,
prior to a determination by the court of appeals.90 The supreme court
split 5-2 in reversing the trial court and held "that [section] 158-7.1 [of
the North Carolina General Statutes], which permits the expenditure of
public moneys for economic development incentive programs, does not
violate the public purpose clause of the North Carolina Constitution."9
The Maready opinion distinguished prior cases that would appear to be
in conflict with the court's decision and addressed, in some depth, the
test for determining whether a particular undertaking by a municipality
is for a public purpose.92 The Maready Court stated that two guiding
principles had been established for making that determination, citing
Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. Morganton.93 Those two principles were:
"(1) [the activity] involves a reasonable connection with the convenience
and necessity of the particular municipality; and (2) the activity benefits
the public generally, as opposed to special interests or persons.""
87. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 619-20 (N.C. 1996).
88. Id. at 618-19.
89. Id. at 618. A judgment entered on August 28, 1995 by Judge Rousseau in
Forsyth County Superior Court enjoined defendants from making incentive grants or
otherwise committing public funds for economic incentive purposes pursuant to section
158-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Id.
90. Id. ("All parties appealed, and on 2 November 1995 this Court granted
defendant-appellants' petition for discretionary review prior to a determination by the
Court of Appeals.").
91. Id. at 627.
92. Id. at 627-28.
93. Id. at 624 (citing Madison Cablevision, Inc. v. Morganton, 386 S.E.2d 200, 207
(N.C. 1989)). *
94. Id. at 624 (quoting Madison Cablevision, 386 S.E.2d at 207) (citations omitted).
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In Blinson, Judge Geer reviewed the Maready court's application of
the Madison Cablevision test. "Maready concluded that economic
development incentives authorized by [section] 158-7.1 [of the North
Carolina General Statutes] satisfied the first prong of the test because
'[e]conomic development has long been recognized as a proper
governmental function."'95 As to the second prong, Judge Geer quoted
from the Maready decision that:
an expenditure does not lose its public purpose merely because it
involves a private actor. Generally, if an act will promote the welfare of
a state or a local government and its citizens, it is for a public purpose.
[The Maready court] held that, under Madison Cablevision, 'section 158-
7.1 clearly serves a public purpose.'96
Then, after quoting the holding in the Maready opinion that section 158-
7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes did not violate the Public
Purpose Clause of the North Carolina Constitution, the Blinson Court
stated: "We can find no meaningful distinction between the present case
and Maready.'"
Judge Geer stated that the plaintiffs had "made no attempt to
demonstrate how the incentives in [Blinson were] legally different from
the 24 local economic incentive packages offered in Maready pursuant to
[North Carolina General Statute section] 158-7.1."98
The computer legislation enacted by the General Assembly
provided substantial tax incentives to Dell that were not authorized by
section 158-7.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which deals only
with local government economic development." However, the court of
appeals, relying on the legislative findings recited in the Dell legislation,
concluded that since the General Assembly had determined that the state
should make an effort to transition from traditional manufacturing
industries to a more contemporary base of computer manufacturing,o10
such incentives served the same economic purposes identified by
Maready and therefore were conclusively for a public purpose."' Thus,
the effect of the Blinson decision was to effectively abandon judicial
95. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268, 275 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Maready,
467 S.E.2d at 624).
96. Id. (quoting Maready, 467 S.E.2d at 625) (internal quotation marks omitted).
97. Id. at 276.
98. Id.
99. Compare 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 204 with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 158-7.1 (2010).
100. However, the Dell plant was not a manufacturing plant but rather an assembly
plant.
101. Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 277-78.
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determination of whether an expenditure of public money was for a
public purpose in favor of simple reliance on legislative conclusions-all
while failing to apply the second prong of the Madison Cablevision test.
After the Public Purpose analysis, the Blinson Court turned to the
plaintiffs' claims under the Exclusive Emoluments provision of article I,
section 32.102 This provision of the North Carolina Constitution says,
"No person or set of persons is entitled to exclusive or separate
emoluments or privileges from the community but in consideration of
public services.""' The court relied on Peacock v. Shinn,o' a court of
appeals decision that evaluated a contractual relationship between the
City of Charlotte and the ownership of the Charlotte NBA franchise.' 5
Peacock held "that when legislation is determined to 'promote the public
benefit' under the Public Purpose Clauses, it necessarily is not an
exclusive emolument."0 6 Thus, the Blinson Court summarily disposed
of the Exclusive Emoluments argument with no further substantive
discussion, holding, in essence, that if the legislation is determined to
promote a public purpose (in other words: a legislative finding of a
public purpose), ipso facto, the expenditure cannot be an Exclusive
Emolument. Of particular note, the issue of Exclusive Emoluments was
never raised nor considered in Maready.0 7
In a timely fashion, the plaintiffs filed a NOA based upon a
substantial constitutional question and, in the alternative, a petition for
discretionary review under section 7A-31 of the North Carolina General
Statutes.' The NOA set out four specific contentions as to why there
was a substantial constitutional question raised by the court of appeals'
decision in Blinson. Specifically, petitioners argued that the court of
appeals decision:
(1) "effectively eliminate[d] judicial review of Public Purpose Clause
claims by allowing the State to establish a 'public purpose' by mere
[legislative] recitation;" 0 9
(2) "[held] that analysis of the public purposes requirements of Article V
H§ 2(1) and 2(7) focuses only on the aim of government action and that
102. Id. at 278.
103. N.C. CONST. art. I, § 32.
104. Peacock v. Shinn, 533 S.E.2d 842 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
105. Id. at 848.
106. Blinson, 651 S.E.2d at 278 (citing Peacock, 533 S.E.2d at 848).
107. See Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996).
108. NOA of Right & Petition for Discretionary Review, Blinson, No. 546PO6-2 (N.C.
Nov. 19, 2007).
109. Id. at 7.
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a violation of those requirements may be determined exclusively by
reference to the 'motivation, aim or intent' of challenged government
action, without any regard whatsoever to the actual, likely, or even
possible effects . . . thus, in essence, the mere recitation of an intent to
benefit the public is sufficient as a matter of law to comply with the
constitutional limitation that taxes be collected and used only for a
public purpose;""o
(3) "[held] that when legislation is determined to promote the public
benefit under the Public Purpose Clauses, it necessarily is not an
exclusive emolument and thereby confuses the analysis of the Exclusive
Emoluments Clauses, N.C. Const. art. I, § 32, with that of the Public
Purposes Clauses;"' and,
(4) "foreclose[d] potential constitutional challenges based on the
Uniformity of Taxation clause, N.C. Const. art. V, § 2(2) and 2(3), and
[was] in conflict with decisions of the Supreme Court by dismissing
certain claims based on lack of standing despite clear allegations in the
Amended Complaint of grounds for taxpayer standing."" 2
The appeal raised substantial constitutional questions about the
scope and application of the Public Purpose Clauses, the Exclusive
Emoluments Clause, and the Uniformity of Taxation Clause which had
either not been considered precisely by the court of appeals or which
highlighted conflict between the court of appeals' opinion and supreme
court precedent." 3
The NOA then set forth a brief recitation of the arguments
advanced on each of the issues, beginning with a discussion of the
Madison Cablevision test for determining violations of the public purpose
clause."' Next, the NOA discussed the scope and application of the
Exclusive Emoluments Clause and the Blinson Court's application of
it." 5  The plaintiffs argued that the decision below "render[ed] the
Exclusive Emoluments Clause superfluous."1 6  Plaintiffs further
contended: "The constitutional question for this Court to resolve is
whether [the Public Purpose and Exclusive Emoluments] constitutional
provisions overlap and, if so, to what extent are their scope and
application common or unique, an issue not precisely considered by this
110. Id. (citation omitted).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 8.
114. Id. at 8-9. For the public purpose test, see Madison Cablevision, Inc. v.
Morganton, 386 S.E.2d 200, 207 (N.C. 1989).
115. NOA of Right & Petition for Discretionary Review, supra note 108, at 9-10.
116. Id. at 9.
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Court."'"7  Finally, the NOA raised the question of the scope and
application of the Uniformity of Taxation Clause in article V of the
North Carolina Constitution. 11 While the trial court and court of
appeals dismissed this claim on standing grounds, the underlying claim
raised a substantial and important question regarding the application of
the Uniformity rule to the unique facts of Blinson."9 Subsequent to the
plaintiffs' filing of both the notice of appeal and the alternative petition
for discretionary review, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the
appeal along with briefs supporting that motion and opposing the
petition for discretionary review. 20 As to the constitutional issue
involving the Public Purpose Clause, the defendants relied primarily on
an argument that Maready had settled the law.12 ' They argued that the
Maready holding, contrary to the arguments advanced by the plaintiffs,
resolved the constitutionality of each of the twenty-four individual
projects challenged in the case. The defendants further contended that
117. Id. at 10.
118. Id. at 10-11.
119. While not directly applicable to the standard for a NOA based upon a substantial
constitutional question, plaintiffs' alternative petition for discretionary review set out in
great detail certain issues of major significance to the jurisprudence of the state:
"(A) Whether limitations exist on the extent to which economic development constitutes
a 'public purpose' as contemplated by Article V, § 2(1) and 2(7) and interpreted by
Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996), and if so, what those
limitations are? (B) Whether analysis of legislative action for purposes of the Public
Purpose Clauses of the State Constitution focuses exclusively on legislative declarations
of purposes without further inquiry? (C) Whether economic incentives tailored to a
particular business constitute an unconstitutional exclusive emolument? (D) Whether
economic incentives offered by the State and local governments to out of state businesses
relocating to North Carolina violate the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution? (E) Whether taxpayers have standing to challenge a taxation scheme,
particularly special tax exemptions, on the grounds that that scheme violates the state
and/or federal constitution even where such taxpayers have not been discriminated
against or otherwise injured by the unconstitutional taxation scheme? [and]
(F) Whether an individual must allege discrimination in order to establish standing to
challenge legislative action on the grounds that that action violates the state
constitutional requirement of uniformity of taxation?" Id. at 14.
120. The North Carolina Court of Appeals' opinion came down on January 16, 2007.
The plaintiffs-appellants' NOA and petition for discretionary review was filed on
November 19, 2007 at the supreme court. Dell filed its motion to dismiss on November
30, 2007, and local and state defendants' motions to dismiss were filed on December 3,
2007.
121. Defendant-Respondent Dell's Motion to Dismiss & Response at passim, Blinson,
No. 546P06-2 (N.C. Nov. 30, 2007); State-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response at
passim, Blinson, No. 546PO6-2 (N.C. Dec. 03, 2007); Local-Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss & Response at passim, Blinson, No. 546PO6-2 (N.C. Dec. 3, 2007).
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the appeal concerned a political question and not a constitutional
question.122 They also attacked the scope of the ruling sought by the
plaintiffs as overbroad, claiming that it would apply to the use of any
public money given to private companies for economic incentives. 12 3
The defendants' defense of the Exclusive Emoluments claim failed
to address why the constitutional issue was not a substantial
constitutional question (and not addressed in Maready), but instead
made a substantive argument that the Dell legislation was not "exclusive"
to Dell and thus could not violate the Emoluments provision. 124  The
defendants ignored the allegations in the complaint that the legislation
was, in fact, crafted exclusively for Dell and that virtually no other entity
in the country could qualify. Additionally, the defendants argued, again
on the merits, that the court of appeals had properly applied the two-
part test for Exclusive Emoluments in Town of Emerald Isle v. State.125
Finally, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to
advance their constitutional claim under the Uniformity Provision. 26
While the plaintiffs acknowledged that the standing question did not
raise a substantial constitutional question, they claimed that the
underlying issue did, and one could perhaps also argue that a rule
effectively eliminating the right to challenge a tax break given to a
corporation and no one else also implicated substantial constitutional
principles.
With the potentially substantial constitutional issues framed by the
respective parties, the supreme court responded on April 10, 2008.127 In
a summary notification and order, the supreme court denied the
plaintiffs' petition for discretionary review on all issues and then granted
122. Defendant-Respondent Dell's Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121,
at 3.
123. Id. at 3-5. The local-defendants suggested that plaintiffs' arguments were "policy
debates" rather than a "substantial constitutional question." See Local-Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 10-11.
124. Defendant-Respondent Dell's Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at
12; State-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 18-20; Local-
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 20-21.
125. Defendant-Respondent Dell's Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121 at
13; State-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 18; Local-
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 20-21. See Town of
Emerald Isle v. State, 360 S.E. 2d 756, 764 (N.C. 1987), for the Emerald Isle test.
126. Defendant-Respondent Dell's Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at
16-19; State-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 20-25.
127. Blinson v. State, 651 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007), notice dismissed and cert.
denied, 661 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. 2008).
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the defendants' motions to dismiss the notice of appeal.' No
explanation was given, and no recourse remained for the plaintiffs.'
The statutory right of appeal had been, for all practical purposes,
eliminated. The decision of the court of appeals was left standing
without ever having been reviewed by the state's highest court.
B. A&F Trademark v. Tolson
One particularly troubling area of the law that has had minimal
review by the supreme court in recent years is the area of corporate
taxation. One prominent attorney in the corporate tax field noted that
the court had not issued a single decision in a major corporate tax case
since 2000.130 Two cases in particular fall with the purview of the
question posed by this Article. The first to be discussed is A & F
Trademark v. Tolson,'3 ' a 2004 opinion of the court of appeals. The case
involved the assessment of corporate franchise and income taxes against
A & F Trademark and other corporate entities. 3 2 Each of the taxpayers
in the case was a wholly owned, non-domiciliary subsidiary corporation
of an Ohio corporation known as The Limited, Inc. ("The Limited").'33
The Limited was engaged in the retail clothing business and had nine
separate, but related, retail subsidiaries operating 130 locations in North
Carolina."'
Under certain licensing and loan agreements, the related retail
companies collectively paid to the taxpayers over $300 million in
royalties and over $120 million in interest in 1994.'3 The court noted,
"[tihe related retail companies deducted these royalty and interest
expenses for tax purposes."36 The taxpayers to whom these funds were
paid had no employees and shared office space, equipment, and supplies
at one centrally located office out of state. 3 1
The taxpayers failed to file corporate franchise and income tax
returns in North Carolina for the fiscal year ending January 31, 1994,
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Sylvia Adcock, Writer's Block?: Some in NC's Legal Community Say Supreme Court
Issues Too Few Opinions, NORTH CAROLINA LAWYERS WEEKLY, Oct. 29, 2010, at 8.
131. A & F Trademark v. Tolson, 605 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
132. Id. at 189.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 189-90.
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maintaining that they did not transact business in the state, and the
state's secretary of revenue assessed them with taxes."13  The taxpayers
protested and the secretary issued a final decision sustaining the
assessment against them." 9  The final decision was appealed and
affirmed by the tax review board."o The taxpayers then filed a petition
in Wake County Superior Court." The trial court subsequently
affirmed the decision of the tax review board.4 2
The taxpayers appealed to the court of appeals raising two issues,
one of which challenged the actions below as violating the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution.4 3  The taxpayers contended
that they did not have the necessary "substantial nexus with North
Carolina on the grounds that they have no physical presence within the
State.""
The court of appeals, with Judge Calabria writing for a unanimous
panel, reviewed the current state of Commerce Clause jurisprudence as
articulated in the federal courts. At issue in particular was the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota."' The
Quill Court, "ultimately concluded that, for purposes of sales and use
taxes assessed against vendors whose only contact with a state is by mail
or common carrier, the substantial nexus prong of Complete Auto could
appropriately be determined by application of a 'bright-line, physical-
presence requirement.'"'46 The court of appeals articulated the taxpayers'
position as suggesting "this requirement applies to all taxes employed by
the states for Commerce Clause nexus analyses and, specifically, must be
used in determining whether the taxes in the present case are
constitutionally infirm.""' The court of appeals then held that it
declined "to adopt the broad reading of Quill suggested by the taxpayers
for numerous reasons."" The opinion went on to give the legal
reasoning behind the intermediate appellate court's ruling. 49
138. Id. at 190.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 193 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
146. A & F Trademark, 605 S.E.2d at 194 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 317).
147. Id. at 194.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 194-95.
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The plaintiffs-appellants filed their NOA based upon a substantial
constitutional question and in the alternative filed a petition for
discretionary review.'50  The NOA noted that the court of appeals
decision had distinguished the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Quill.' 5' The NOA posed the question of whether, under Quill, "the
Commerce Clause permit[ted] North Carolina to impose income taxes
or franchise taxes on a foreign corporation with no physical presence in
[the] State?""' The plaintiffs-appellants noted that the issue had been
raised, briefed, and decided by both the trial court and court of
appeals."' In reviewing Quill, the plaintiffs-appellants noted that the
court below had distinguished Quill on the basis that Quill involved use
taxes, whereas this case involves franchise and income taxes.5 5 The
NOA went on to state: "But as Petitioners will explain in their brief on
the merits, the policy considerations underlying Quill's physical presence
requirement apply with equal in not greater force in the context of
income and franchise taxes."
The state countered both the NOA (and the petition for
discretionary review) by arguing that the case primarily involved
questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation, not constitutional
interpretation. 5 6  In addition, the state argued three points in its
response and motion to dismiss the appeal: (1) that the case law was
settled in this area, (2) that Quill merely carved out an exception limited
to use taxes, and (3) that the court of appeals had properly decided the
case. Plaintiffs-appellants wrote: "The opinion below properly held that
Quill did not create a new physical presence standard applicable to
income and franchise taxes, as Petitioners maintain. 'The Quill court
merely carved out a narrow exception in the area of use tax collection
duties.""5 1
One can easily contend that the notice of appeal and petition for
discretionary review, along with the state's response to each,
comprehensively framed the issues and presented valid arguments for
150. NOA, A & F Trademark, No. 23PO5 (N.C. Jan. 11, 2005); Petition for
Discretionary Review, A & F Trademark, No. 23PO5 (N.C. Jan. 11, 2005).
151. NOA, A & F Trademark, No. 23P05.
152. NOA at 2, A & F Trademark, No. 23PO5.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Response to NOA & Petition for Discretionary Review, A & F Trademark, No.
23PO5 (N.C. Jan. 24, 2005).
157. Id. at 9 (quoting Borden Chemicals & Plastics v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73, 80 (111.
App. Ct. 2000)).
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the court to consider. However, the court granted the State's motion to
dismiss and denied the petition for discretionary review.158 Once again,
no explanation for the refusal to review the decision was articulated.159
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS AND SOLUTIONS
While a sampling of two cases certainly does not present an
overwhelming body of evidence on this issue, these two decisions by the
court of appeals and the rejection for review by the supreme court are
symptomatic of the concern practitioners have. As previously noted,
many of the NOAs based upon a substantial constitutional question have
no merit, but it is statistically likely that only a few out of nearly 500
filed with the court over the past five years meet the test.160 Short of a
miraculous change of perspective by the members of the court, what can
be done to address the problem?
The primary recommendation that this Author would submit is a
legislative remedy amending the statute. Since a right of appeal founded
upon a substantial constitutional question is legislatively based as well as
a guaranteed statutory right of litigants,'' it is only logical that the first
place to turn is to the General Assembly. In looking back at the purpose
underlying this right of appeal, it is clear that the framers of this
provision were relying on the Courts Commission's emphasis on making
sure the most important legal questions coming up on appeal,
particularly those involving a substantial constitutional question, would
be reviewed by the state's highest court.'62 Whether on appeal from a
decision by the court of appeals, or either on its own motion or a party's
motion to bypass the court of appeals, it is the supreme court's
responsibility to review cases involving substantial constitutional
questions.
Thus, the first legislative change is to refine the language in section
7A-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes to demonstrate the
mandatory aspect of this provision. Currently the statute simply states
that "an appeal lies of right to the Supreme Court."6 3 This may appear
158. A & F Trademark v. Tolson, 611 S.E.2d 168 (N.C. 2005).
159. Id.
160. Section 7A-30 of the North Carolina General Statutes requires that the
constitutional issue be both substantial and one not covered by the NCSC before, two
hurdles that lessen the likelihood of review. See State v. Colson, 163 S.E.2d 376, 383
(1968).
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. HE 7A-30, 31 (2010).
162. See supra notes 4-31 and accompanying text.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30.
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to be self-explanatory, but in light of the current practice, more specific
language might be beneficial.1 6' This Author would suggest rewriting
section 7A-30 to provide: "Any party which has properly raised on
appeal a substantial constitutional question, as defined and explained
below, has an absolute right to have the constitutional question or
questions reviewed and decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court."
Secondly, the General Assembly should consider amending section
7A-30 to provide a definition for what constitutes a substantial
constitutional question. While the language this Author proposes would
track to some degree the case law reviewed previously,"' a more precise
definition should be used. This Author would suggest the following:
A substantial constitutional question raised under either the United
States Constitution or the North Carolina Constitution is one calling for
the interpretation and application of the constitutional provision at issue
which involves one or more of the following considerations: (1) if, in
the case of a provision of the United States Constitution, the
interpretation as to the meaning and intent of the framers has not been
conclusively reviewed by the United States Supreme Court; (2) if a
provision of the United States Constitution is at issue and its meaning
and intent have been conclusively determined by the United States
Supreme Court but the factual circumstances in the appeal to the North
Carolina Supreme Court are sufficiently unique and different from the
federal courts' application of the constitutional provision; (3) if, in the
case of a provision of the North Carolina Constitution, the interpretation
as to the meaning and intent of the framers has not been conclusively
reviewed by the North Carolina Supreme Court; (4) if a provision of the
North Carolina Constitution is at issue and the interpretation as to the
meaning and intent of the provision has been conclusively determined
by the North Carolina Supreme Court but the factual circumstances are
sufficiently unique from those cases determined under that provision by
the North Carolina Supreme Court; (5) if a provision of the North
Carolina Constitution is at issue and the interpretation as to the meaning
and intent of the provision has been conclusively determined by the
North Carolina Supreme Court but there is only one decision on that
provision and a dissenting opinion was filed and the appealing party
contends that the prior decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court
should be reversed; (6) if, when dealing with a provision of the North
Carolina Constitution that grants a right or rights to the citizens of the
state and there is parallel provision in the United States Constitution, the
interpretation of the parallel provision in the United States Constitution
being the basis for the interpretation of the provision in the North
164. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
165. See supra Parts IIB, II.A-B.
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Carolina Constitution, and the appealing Party contends that the North
Carolina provision should be interpreted to give greater rights to North
Carolina citizens than those afforded under the United States
Constitution.
Thirdly, from a procedural standpoint this Author would
recommend amending section 7A-30 to require certain procedural
pleadings by the appealing party or parties requiring that the specific
categories applicable to the appeal be set forth with specificity and brief
argument as to their application. This change would make sure that the
NOA based upon a substantial constitutional question is properly
focused and documented for the supreme court. This change should
also include an opportunity for the opposing party, if the opposing party
disagrees with the contentions made by the appellant, to counter those
arguments as to why the issue or issues do not meet the test for a
substantial constitutional question. Such a requirement would possibly
eliminate a number of baseless NOAs asserting a substantial
constitutional question issue since greater clarity would be required of
the appellant.
Finally, this Author would amend section 7A-30 to require the
supreme court, in dismissing an appeal of right based upon a substantial
constitutional question, to enter with the order of dismissal a brief
explanation of why the appeal did not meet any of the criteria set forth
above. Without making too much additional work for the court, it
would seem easy enough for an order entered dismissing the NOA based
upon a substantial constitutional question to provide some guidance to
practitioners as to the grounds for dismissal of the appeal.
By way of example as to how these changes would work, one need
only look at one of the issues raised in Blinson concerning the
constitutionality of incentives awarded to Dell. Plaintiffs contended that
the application of the Public Purpose Clause in the North Carolina
Constitution was violated by the Dell incentives when the Madison
Cablevision two-part test was applied and that the court of appeals
decision had erroneously characterized the test and applied it in a way as
to eviscerate the meaning of the Public Purpose Clause.' 6 Defendants
countered that the Maready decision had resolved all questions and thus
there was no substantial constitutional question.167 Plaintiffs contended
in their NOA that Maready had only resolved whether section 158-7.1
166. NOA of Right & Petition for Discretionary Review, supra note 115, at 7-9.
167. Defendant-Respondent Dell's Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at
passim; State-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at 11-17;
Local-Defendants' Motion to Dismiss & Response, supra note 121, at passim.
2011] 237
27
Orr: What Exactly is a "Substantial Constitutional Question" for Purpo
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2010
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
was constitutional under the Public Purpose Clause and that none of the
specific projects receiving incentives in Maready had been specifically
analyzed under the Madison Cablevision test.16 In addition, the Maready
decision was a 5-2 split and was the only case decided by the supreme
court on the application of economic development and the use of
incentives.169  Using the proposed definition of "substantial
constitutional question" set out above, the issue raised in Blinson would
have arguably met two of the criteria for a substantial constitutional
question. While Maready addressed the overall question of the public
purpose use and the statute authorizing local governments to use
incentives for economic development, the Dell case presented a unique
set of facts that merited review by the supreme court. Also, since
Maready was a split decision and the North Carolina Supreme Court had
not revisited the issue and plaintiffs contended that Maready should be
overruled, the issue would be considered a substantial constitutional
question.
V. CONCLUSION
The purpose of this Article is to be neither critical of the North
Carolina Supreme Court, nor to recommend unnecessary ways to
increase the court's workload. Instead, this Article hopefully has
highlighted a growing level of concern and confusion among the North
Carolina Bar as to what exactly a substantial constitutional question
embraces and how the supreme court is and should be applying the
standard. Our state's highest court has an obligation, as articulated by
the courts commission, to aggressively reach out to address substantial
constitutional questions. Hopefully, this Article will assist the court in
meeting this important responsibility.
168. NOA of Right & Petition for Discretionary Review, supra note 115, at 7-9.
169. Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615 (N.C. 1996).
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